International Investment Law and General International Law -From
Clinical Isolation to Systemic Integration?
Comments by Christoph Schreuer:
A. Uniformity and Coherence in Treaty Interpretation
Much of what we have heard from Michael Waibel was focused on the capacity of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) to achieve coherence in the interpretation of investment treaties. In this context, it is already a major achievement that the principles of interpretation contained in Articles 31-33 of the VCLT are today practically universally accepted. Let us not forget that these principles were at one time hotly contested not least during their drafting in Vienna in 1969. At the same time, I have rather limited confidence in the capacity of the VCLT to produce predictable results and hence to contribute to uniformity in the interpretation of treaties. Different tribunals, even if they faithfully apply Articles 31-33 of the VCLT, are likely to reach different results. Therefore, the usefulness of the VCLT as a tool for the harmonization of practice in the application of investment treaties is limited. But there is no doubt that the VCLT's provisions on treaty interpretation are a useful starting point. Perhaps they should be regarded not so much as rules that will lead to inescapable results but rather as an intellectual checklist that should be used when applying treaties. Treaty interpretation is not a mechanical process that will automatically lead to the correct result if only the right method is applied. The old adage that treaty interpretation is not a science but an art is still very true today.
B. Effective and Restrictive Interpretation
The term «effective interpretation» is somewhat ambivalent. It can mean two quite different things. One meaning is that every treaty provision should be interpreted so as to give it some meaning. In other words it should not be deprived of all effect. This is a perfectly sensible maxim. The other meaning of «effective interpretation» is a purported principle of extensive or expansive interpretation. Under this maxim treaties should be interpreted so as to give them maximum effect. Such a suggestion is of doubtful value and has not been widely accepted in practice.
In international investment law «restrictive» or «effective» methods of interpretation have a particular connotation. Since investment treaties are focused on the rights of investors their restrictive interpretation will tend to favour host States. Conversely, their effective interpretation will typically favour investors. Although tribunals have at times subscribed to one or the other method of interpretation 1 the prevalent and clearly better view appears to be a balanced approach that rejects both these methods. From the perspective of the principles of interpretation as enshrined in the VCLT there is no reason to criticize tribunals for relying on a treaty's object and purpose. The basic rule, as reflected in the first paragraph of Article 31, lists object and purpose as a primary principle of treaty interpretation together with good faith, ordinary meaning and context.
D. Official Interpretations
I am a bit more sceptical than Michael Waibel of the role of States officially interpreting treaties in pending disputes between investors and host States. Obviously, a unilateral assertion by a disputing State party is of limited value. Apart from the fact that the State is likely to have an evident interest in the acceptance of a particular interpretation by the tribunal, arguments presented in litigation are typically drafted by the State's counsel. They do not necessarily reflect the meaning that the States Parties had in mind when concluding the treaty. It is an interesting question whether pleadings on behalf of a State put forward by a private law firm may be regarded as State practice in the sense of the VCLT 8 or for purposes of developing customary international law.
In most cases there will be no available information concerning the circumstances of a BIT's conclusion. BITs are frequently based on model texts with limited negotiations. There are typically no records that can be used by way of travaux préparatoires.
In Aguas del Tunari v. Bolivia 9 the Tribunal sought information from the investor's home State on certain aspects of the BIT's interpretation. But it did not find the information thus obtained helpful. 10 In CME v. The NAFTA has a mechanism whereby the Free Trade Commission (FTC), a body composed of representatives of the three States parties, can adopt binding interpretations of the treaty. 12 The FTC has made use of this method in July 2001 in interpreting the concepts of «fair and equitable treatment» and «full protection and security» under Article 1105 of the NAFTA.
13
Some BITs offer an institutional mechanism to obtain authentic interpretations of their meaning.
14 But this method has serious drawbacks. States are prone to attempt to influence proceedings to which they are parties or are likely to become parties. A mechanism whereby a party to a dispute is able to influence the outcome of judicial proceedings by issuing an official interpretation to the detriment of the other party is incompatible with principles of a fair procedure and is hence undesirable. This is true even if the official interpretation requires also the assent of the other party or parties to the treaty. In addition, a system involving hundreds of separate treaties each with its own mechanism for an official interpretation is unlikely to lead to a harmonization of interpretations and to systemic integration.
